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Abstract∗
 
This paper constructs several objective indicators of regulatory intensity in the context of the 
Spanish decentralization since 1978. Our aim is to develop a quantitative measure of the levels of 
regulatory intensity set by different regions in Spain. The dynamic nature of the decentralization 
process requires that we take into account the initial institutional framework for decentralization 
and the successive transfers of powers to the regions. As a result, we obtain a series of variables that 
measure regulatory intensity across Spanish regions in the period 1978-2009. 
 
Keywords: Regulation, Regulatory Intensity, Decentralisation, Spain, Self-governing Communities, Regions, 
Federalism 
 
Summary 
 
1.Introduction 
2.Developing an Objective Measure of Regulatory Intensity 
3.The Spanish decentralisation 
3.1.Decentralisation Framework: Principles and Limits 
3.2.Evolution of Decentralisation (1978 – 2010) 
4.Measuring Regulatory Burden in the Spanish Decentralized context. 
4.1. First Measure: Number of Pp. on the SGCs’ official journals (1978-2008) 
4.2. Second measure: Data from Aranzadi reporter (1988-2009). 
5.Conclusion. 
6.Bibliographical References: 
                                                        
∗ This paper is part of a broader project that tries to assess the impact of disparate regulation by Spanish 
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Development in Spain” at the 24th Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, 
celebrated at Copenhagen Business School in September 2007 (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=948457, visited 22.10.2010) and at a Workshop Organized by the Spanish 
Association of Law and Economics at Universidad Complutense de Madrid in June 2008. The criticisms 
and suggestions by the attendants to those meetings are hereby gratefully acknowledged. We also 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is substantial academic literature on the measurement and analysis of regulation. 
Most of the studies focus on particular types of regulation, normally industry-specific, and 
only look at the limited reality in which those rules and their enforcement produce effects 
[see the surveys by JOSKOW & ROSE (1989) and JOSKOW & NOLL (1981) and see also KAHN 
(1988)]. 
 
There is also a stream of literature that analyzes public regulation in general terms, as the 
set of rules and supporting institutions that establish the conditions for business 
organizations to operate and market transactions to take place [see OGUS (1994, pp.15-75)].  
Some of the studies on general regulation and rules have built regulatory indicators that 
are used cross-country to compare governance and regulatory outcomes in different 
countries1. On top of their academic interest, governments and international organizations 
use them as a relevant tool for policy and regulation reform. 
 
Most regulatory measures try to capture the quality and enforcement of regulatory rules 
but they face several difficulties in creating and shaping an objective and comprehensive 
indicator. They generally introduce initial assumptions or preconceptions that require 
some subjective assessment or judgment. Objective and subjective measures can be 
distinguished2, since shaping and framing risks involuntarily introducing subtle 
ideological biases. 
 
The subjective prejudice is clear in surveys, since it is very difficult to avoid any bias in 
framing and formulating the questions included in the survey and choosing the 
respondents and sample size [PRYOR (2002, pp706)]. Surely, some surveys are organized in 
a way that provide respondents no leeway for introducing their subjective valuations and 
opinions3, but the questions asked may easily and involuntarily be biased. Although less 
prevalent, other indicators that code different features of law and governmental 
regulations may also introduce preliminary subjective valuations4. Indeed, although they 
                                                        
1 On the limitations of these indicators, see ROSENTHAL & VOETEN (2007). 
 
2 WOODRUFF (2006, p.107). Of course, subjective indicators (mainly surveys) are always required when they 
try to capture informality (id. 121). 
 
3 WOODRUFF (2006:109) refers to World Bank’s Doing Business surveys as one trying to follow this 
methodology. On the other hand, CONWAY, JANOD Y NICOLETTI (2005, pp. 3-9) consider PMR indicators of 
the OECD International regulation database to be objective, but they neglect that it introduces subjective 
measures in the choice of relevant regulatory elements and weight assignment to each of them. 
 
4 Nevertheless, in our opinion some of the indicators considered objective may suffer some subjectivity in 
their construction, see NICOLETTI & PRYOR (2006, p.435). This may be of no much importance as they show 
how the subjective and objective measures are strongly and statistically correlated in their results despite 
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may be based on objective data, they will occasionally fall in a subjective bias when they 
choose test cases and simulations that provide the spinal cord of the indicator. 
For that reason, we aim at building a purely objective measure of regulation adopted by 
Spanish Self Governing Communities (hereinafter SGCs), in which no prior inference or 
deduction is made from crude data5. Our intent is to develop an indicator that measures 
regulatory intensity, not regulatory quality, and that allows us to determine comparatively 
how far do SGCs go in exercising their legislative and regulatory powers. 
On the other hand, objective measures normally have the disadvantage of being unable to 
look at regulation enforcement and effectiveness [NICOLETTI & PRYOR (2006, p.435)]. It is 
one thing to look at the rules or regulations in paper (‘law on the books’), and another one to 
look at whether and how they are being enforced or implemented [PRYOR (2002, p.697-
698)].  
Being it complex to calculate regulatory intensity, it is even more difficult to assess and 
measure ‘law in action’ without making any kind of subjective valuation. Measuring law 
abidance and enforcement normally involves detailed analysis of administrative decisions, 
court opinions and other quality measures of compliance and of the legal environment in 
which activities take place. However, as we will see later on, we aim also at including an 
objective proxy of effectiveness or enforcement intensity in our measurement of SGC 
variations. 
 
 
2. Developing an Objective Measure of Regulatory Intensity 
 
It is difficult to establish an objective and accurate measure of regulatory intensity, but the 
Spanish decentralized State provides a unique ground for shaping an indicator that 
captures the variations in their exercise of legislative and regulatory powers and allows 
making comparisons6. As we will explain later (see infra § 3), Spanish SGC provide an 
                                                                                                                                                                  
also differences in coverage or scope of indicators (id. 444: “Both the objective and subjective measures seem to 
reflect the same reality”). 
 
5 That will fulfill a strict objectivity test, see VOIGT (2009, p.19): "«Objetivity» in measurement implies that 
anybody repeating the identical measurement exercise should end up with exactly the same results". In their 
analysis of regulatory intensity in Spain, GUAL ET AL (2006, pp.30-32) and ZARATÉ & VALLES (2010) use the 
number of rules adopted by SGCs but later on make a further distinction among them according to the 
subject matter of regulation which already requires some kind subjective assessment. A regulation or rule-
count exercise is undoubtedly objective [and we will make our own later (see infra § 4)] but it does not tell 
you anything about the content of the rule, which can be better approached with a page-count exercise. 
 
6 In this paper, aside from developing the methodology, describing the variables and providing the rough 
empirical results we do not purport to further elaborate on them and, for example, look at their 
relationship with other relevant regional measures and data (such as SGCs’ budgets, SGCs’ governing 
political parties, etc.), which may lead to interesting conclusions. See, however MARCOS & SANTALÓ (2010). 
Neither are we trying to construct an (isolated) SGC regulatory ranking, as we doubt the usefulness of this 
exercise and the distorted portrait of reality it might give. However, those interested in a ranking of SGCs 
that looks at different dimensions of regional policy and activity, see CABRILLO (2008).  
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excellent setting to measure different strategies on regulatory intensity and effectiveness 
and enforcement intensity by SGC. 
 
We will look at an indirect and rough objective indicator of regulatory intensity: the 
number of pp. published in the official journals. They will be used as the indication of the 
proneness of SGC to introduce new regulations and enforce them7. This idea is not new. 
Milton Friedman was the first one to use the number of pp. in the Federal Register (Fed. 
Reg.) as a proxy for US federal regulatory activity, pointing out how during President 
Nixon’s mandate the number of pp. of the Register doubled, whilst it halved during 
Reagan’s Presidency (see table in next page). Friedman was conscious that the Register was 
an imperfect measure, but illustrative nevertheless8.  
 
 
Source: http://www.hooverdigest.org/043/friedman.html (extracted from Milton 
Friedman, “Freedom’s Friend”, Wall Street Journal, 11 june 2004, A8,visited 
22.10.2010). 
 
                                                        
7 DAWSON & SEATER (2007, pp.7-8) describe it as a “completely objective” method. GOFF (1996, pp.24-29) 
uses it and the United States Code Annotated (USCA) as a component of the Effective Regulatory Index 
(ERI) he constructs in his book. 
 
8 The Fed. Reg. is published daily (it can be downloaded from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html, 
visited 22.10.2010). It is the main source for U.S. federal government agency proposed and final rules, 
notices of meetings and adjudicatory proceedings (final rules published in the Register will ultimately 
become part of the Code of Federal Regulations).  
 
It is true that it does not publish all the laws and regulation, but only administrative rules (“They are not 
laws and yet they have the effect of laws and like laws impose costs and restrain activities”) and also that it 
publishes more than solely rules affecting business and economic activity, but he considered it as a valid 
proxy for regulatory activity. 
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Using the number pp. in Regional Official Journals as an indicator of regulatory intensity is 
intuitively appealing9. The enactment process of laws and regulation requires their prior 
publication as a condition of their effectiveness. It does so to provide those subject to the 
legal and regulatory rules the possibility of learning and knowing that a new rule is in 
force. This is a major principle of the rule of law10. Technically,  Official Journals are not 
source of law themselves but they act as a necessary publicity instrument, to diffuse 
knowledge of laws11. 
 
Regulatory intensity is a good proxy for the regulatory burden on business. Indeed, firms 
and their advisors look at Official Journals of the jurisdictions in which they operate as one 
of the instruments to know the applicable rules, and –therefore- it is plausible to relate the 
with the burden imposed by ruleslength of the official journal 
                                                       
12. Furthermore, the 
 
9 In fact, recent studies on global taxation have used the number of pp. of primary tax legislation as the 
proxy for tax regulatory burden, such as PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS-WORLD BANK (2006, pp.17-18). In 
Spain, number of pp. in official journals has been used to graphically show the regulatory burden 
introduced by the State (not looking at SGCs) and even by the EU, see VALLÉS & ZARATE (2006, pp.218 & 
220) and ROSELL (2006, pp.8-9). 
 
10 The publicity of norms is one of the principles over which the State and the Bill of Rights is built in the 
Spanish Constitution (section 9.3). See legal arguments 2 and 3, Constitutional Court Judgment 179/1989, 
of 2 November (BOE 290, 4 December 1989) 
 
11 Article 2 of Spanish Civil code sets this requirement for the effectiveness and applications of norms. 
Section 91 of the Spanish Constitution introduces the publication requirement for State laws whilst section 
24.4 of the Law of Government (50/1997, of 27 de November) does it for State regulations. The same 
requirements are established for SGC’s laws and regulations in their respective Statutes of Autonomy. 
 
12 A similar quantitative methodology (leximetrics) is used by COOTER & GINSBURG (2004), who count the 
number of words in a legal document to systematically compare differences in legal specificity across 
countries (in the transposition of EU Directives) after normalizing the differences for linguistic variations, 
explaining them by agency problems between drafters and interpreters of legal instruments. Although the 
same terminology is used in other recent numerical comparative corporate law studies –LELE & SIEMS 
(2007) and SIEMS (2008)-, in the end their measurement exercise is based in the (qualitative and subjective) 
choice, use and analysis of variables, weighting and coding for shareholder protection in comparing legal 
systems. 
 
Other studies have used objective data as the length (words/pp.) and footnoting judicial opinions as an 
indicative of changes in the law and enforcement patterns [see SCHUCK & ELLIOT 1990, pp.1003-1004; 
regarding the influence of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) in the review of administrative 
decisions by courts]. LANDES & POSNER (2004, pp.2-5) consider the changes in the length (measured by 
words) of the Copyright, Trademark and Patent Acts as an indication of the correlative expansion of 
intellectual property rights and the growth in Intellectual Property Protection. Finally, BLACK & SPRIGS II 
(2010) try to find out the determinants of the length (words) of 27.615 majority opinions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court from 1791-2005 (considering law clerks’ involvement, Justices interaction, case importance 
or unimportance, etc). 
 
In Spain, SANTA MARÍA PASTOR (2004, pp.38-63-88) uses the length (pp. and characters) of laws and 
regulations as an indication of an over-regulation trend by public powers and the increasing complexity of 
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compliance costs that firms incur are directly related to the quantity or amount of 
legislation and regulation adopted. 
 
Of course, like Milton Friedman, we are conscious that some of the Official journals’ pp. 
will not relate to regulatory burden over business activities, as things different to rules are 
published in the Official journals (procurement notices, announcements). Besides, some of 
the rules are of organizational character and concern administrative bureaucracy, the 
organization of State and State bodies, nevertheless we think these are also regulatory 
activities that may have an indirect impact on business environment. Therefore, we have to 
bear in mind that part of the content of the Official journal cannot be strictly considered of 
normative or regulatory relevance –because it is not formally legislation or any other form 
of direct regulatory activity- but, at the same time, we deem that even published changes in 
the organisation of public administration, judicial announcements or other notices impose 
direct and indirect costs on businesses. On the one hand, the bigger the volume of the 
Official journal, the larger the information costs associated to its review. On the other hand, 
administrative and judicial activity in most cases involve private companies’ interests and, 
therefore, publications related to public administration and judiciary activities are also an 
indicator of the indirect compliance costs that business firms face13. 
 
 
3. The Spanish decentralisation 
 
The Spanish decentralization since 1978 provides a natural setting in which we can shape 
an indicator of regional regulatory intensity. Before we do that, we need to delve briefly on 
the framework and characteristics of the regional organization of Spain after the adoption 
of the current Constitution in 1978. 
 
After the fall of the totalitarian regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain recovered 
political freedom and the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (hereinafter, the “Constitution”)14 
created a new institutional framework for the organization of the State. The Constitution 
allows for a flexible model of decentralised State but establishes an absolute (although 
vague) limit by clearly stating: “under no circumstances shall a federation of Self-governing 
Communities be allowed” (section 145)15.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
t
w
 
he Spanish legal system (he also compared the amount of characters employed in laws and regulations 
ith those superseded). 
13 However, the construction of an enforcement indicator that captures regional variations in law and 
regulation enforcement would be misleading as regional and local regulation are frequently enforced 
together and at the same time with national ones and there is not feasible way to isolate them. 
 
14 A full-text official English translation of the Spanish Constitution of December 1978 is available at 
http://www.congreso.es/ingles/funciones/constitucion/const_espa_texto.pdf, visited 22.10.2010. 
 
15 The Constitution declared the new political system to be “based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish 
Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-
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Therefore, the Constitution allows for a decentralised, although not federal, structure of the 
State. The final configuration of this “State of the Autonomies” has resulted in the Spanish 
territory being divided in seventeen Self-governing Communities (hereinafter, the 
“SGC”)16, created in the first few years after the enactment of the Constitution. Some of the 
SGC inherited the tradition of certain historic territories (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque 
Country) whilst the rest of the territorial divisions were mainly based on geographic 
criteria. 
 
The decentralization process in Spain was aimed at transferring powers and powers from 
the State to smaller entities of regional base –the SGC- and it was inspired not only on 
economic reasons, but also on political and historical grounds (PÉREZ DÍAZ, 1993). Indeed, 
decentralisation began in 1978 as a reaction to the strong centralism of the Franco regime. 
However, like in federal States, theoretically it was not to take place in those policies and 
areas in which different reasons advice for a uniform or homogeneous design across the 
entire State. 
 
 
3.1. Decentralisation Framework: Principles and Limits 
According to the Constitution, a second-tier constitutional document called Statute of 
Autonomy shall “be the basic institutional rule of each Self-governing Community and the State 
shall recognize and protect them as an integral part of its legal system” (section 147.1). Most 
noteworthy for our purposes, the Statutes of Autonomy shall regulate “the powers assumed 
[by the SGC] within the framework laid down by the Constitution and the basic rules for the 
transfer of the corresponding services” (section 147.2.d). The Constitution also draws a 
distinction between the powers that can be assumed by the SGC (section 148) and those 
that will in any case lie on the Central Government (section 149)17. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all” (section 2). 
More precisely, the Constitution establishes that “in the exercise of the right to self-government recognised in 
section 2 of the Constitution, bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, 
insular territories and provinces with a historic regional status may accede to self-government and form Self-
governing Communities (Comunidades Autónomas)” (section 143.1). 
 
16 These are: Galicia, Cantabria, Asturias, País Vasco, La Rioja, Navarra, Aragón, Cataluña, Extremadura, 
Castilla y León, Madrid, Castilla – La Mancha, Valencia, Baleares, Murcia, Andalucía and Canarias. 
Moreover, there are two Self-governing cities in the north-African territories of Ceuta and Melilla. 
 
17 Annex 1 reproduces both sections as the constitutional framework for the distribution of competencies 
between the Central Government and the Self-governing Communities, and lists the Laws approving the 
seventeen Statutes of Autonomy. A comparative description of the seventeen Statutes of Autonomy is 
available (in Spanish) at http://www.mpt.es/documentacion 
/politica_autonomica/Estatutos_Autonomia/estatutos_materias/parrafo/016/document_es/16-
Competencias_nuevo_05_b.pdf (visited 22.10.2010) 
 
As a closing rule, and trying to avoid any gaps in the distribution of powers, the Constitution establishes 
that: “matters not expressly assigned to the State by this Constitution may fall under the jurisdiction of the Self-
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Firstly, the Spanish political system is designed around a distribution of powers between 
central and regional legislatures, that have different legislative capacities and, therefore, it 
generates a framework for political and regulatory competition amongst SGC. However, 
the broad wording and (partial) overlap between some of the powers described in sections 
148 (SGC’s powers) and 149 (Central Government powers) of the Constitution introduces a 
degree of fuzziness in this division of powers between Central Government and SGC. 
Indeed, the exact wording of the powers –as they are assumed by SGC on their statutes- 
presents considerable variation, as different SGC use diverging terms to allude to the same 
powers and some of their definitions/descriptions enter in conflict with State powers. 
 
Secondly, the foundation of SGC is also coupled with some financial autonomy and fund 
transfers by the Central state that may be increased across time18. However, taxation was 
only transferred to the Basque Country and Navarra, following a historical privilege. 
 
Finally, not all SGC have assumed the same powers over time, nor do they have exactly the 
same powers nowadays (GARCÍA MILA & MCGUIRE, 2007). It is also true that a mere 
 quantitative comparison of total powers transferred is misleading as they may lead to
                                                                                                                                                                  
governing Communities by virtue of their Statutes of Autonomy. Jurisdiction on matters not claimed by Statutes of 
Autonomy shall fall with the State, whose laws shall prevail, in case of conflict, over those of the Self-governing 
Communities regarding all matters in which exclusive jurisdiction has not been conferred upon the latter. State law 
shall in any case be suppletory of that of the Self-governing Communities.” (section 149.3). 
 
Finally, in order to limit the regulatory dispersion associated to the State of the Autonomies, the 
Constitution empowers the Central Government to “enact laws laying down the necessary principles for 
harmonizing the rulemaking provisions of the Self-governing Communities, even in the case of matters over which 
jurisdiction has been vested to the latter, where this is necessary in the general interest. It is incumbent upon the 
Parliament], by overall majority of the members of each House [i.e. Congress and Senate], to evaluate this 
ecessity” (section 150.3). However, to date, this power has never been used. 
[
n
 
18 In this regard, the Constitution determines that “the Self-governing Communities shall enjoy financial 
autonomy for the development and exercise of their powers, in conformity with the principles of coordination with the 
State Treasury and solidarity among all Spaniards” (section 156.1). To achieve financial autonomy, “the 
resources of the Self-governing Communities shall consist of: a) Taxes wholly or partially made over to them by the 
State; surcharges on State taxes and other shares in State revenue. b) Their own taxes, rates and special levies. c) 
Transfers from an inter-territorial compensation fund and other allocations to be charged to the State Budget. d) 
Revenues accruing from their property and private law income. e) Interest from loan operations” (section 157.1). 
 
More specifically, “an allocation may be made in the State Budget to the Self-governing Communities in proportion 
to the amount of State services and activities for which they have assumed responsibility and to guarantee a 
minimum level of basic public services throughout Spanish territory”; and, additionally, “with the aim of 
redressing inter-territorial economic imbalances and implementing the principle of solidarity, a compensation fund 
shall be set up for investment expenditure, the resources of which shall be distributed by the [Parliament] among the 
Self-governing Communities and provinces, as the case may be” (section 158). Therefore, the assumption of 
powers has usually been accompanied by transfer of funds from Central Government’s budget to SGC’s 
(MOLERO 2001; MORENO 2002) that may have also had an impact on the development of regional economies 
in Spain. 
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different levels of autonomy. In fact, the Constitution allows for a dynamic evolution of the 
transfer of powers between the Central Government and each of the seventeen SGC: “the 
Self-governing Communities may, by amendment of their Statutes of Autonomy, progressively 
enlarge their powers” (section 148.2). Therefore, each SGC has evolved in a particular and 
different way from the rest –depending on a large number of factors, such as historical 
preconditions, social or political background, level of economic development, etc.– (see 
infra § 3.2. for a more detailed explanation of this process). These disparities in the 
assumption of powers have generated a more suitable framework for regulatory 
competition and economic impact analyses (LOPEZ LABORDA & VALLÉS JIMÉNEZ, 2006; 
GUAL, JÓDAR ROSELL & RUÍZ POSINO 2006, ZARATE & VALLÉS JIMÉNEZ 2010; MARCOS & 
SANTALÓ 2010). 
 
In exercise of their powers, SGCs may enact laws and adopt regulations, which are 
applicable to the agents and activities that take place in their territory. Occasionally 
conflicts may arise with the State or with neighbouring SGC regarding extraterritorial 
effects of SGC’s rules19.  
 
3.2. Evolution of Decentralisation (1978 – 2010) 
 
As we have already mentioned, Spanish SGC have assumed different powers and, 
therefore, have reached diverse levels of self-government20. Moreover, not all of them 
exercise their legislative and regulatory powers with the same depth and intensity. 
As regards the assumption of powers, we can see how the major transfers have taken place 
in subsequent waves (see Table 1). The first one occurred in the early 1980s when the 
system was being set up and the second one in the mid 1990s. It is important to stress that 
the decentralisation process started from scratch in 1978, as the approval of the 
Constitution marked a switch from the centralist State set-up during the regime of the 
general Franco towards a decentralised system and the beginning of the new 
organizational model.  
 
                                                        
19 Moreover, the development of the State of the Autonomies in Spain generates an important debate about 
the appropriate schemes to finance the level of expense required by this two-tier system of public 
administration. In practice, however, the system is composed of three tiers, given that a local 
administration exists in addition to the abovementioned central and regional administrations. 
Nevertheless, the legislative and regulatory powers of municipal governments are much more limited 
than and largely conditioned by the regional and central regulations. Therefore, for the purposes of our 
study, we will focus on the existing relationship between central and regional administrations and, more 
specifically, on the legislative and regulatory activities of the SGC. This approach is consistent with that 
pursued by Spanish constitutional commentators, see for example AJA (2003). 
 
20 Table 1 summarises the transfer of powers to the different SGC during the period 1978–2010. A full table 
of transference of powers for the period 1978–2010 is available (in Spanish) at 
http://www9.mpt.es/documentacion/politica_autonomica/traspasos/est_traspasos/parrafo/00/docum
ent_es/traspasos_1978_2010.pdf, visited 22.10.2010. 
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As mentioned before, the assumption of powers has not been homogeneous throughout the 
seventeen SGCs [GARCÍA MILÁ & MCGUIRE (2007)]. Some of them assumed a large number 
of powers in the early 1980s, while others have achieved more extended autonomy only in 
the last 10 years. It is important to stress again that the quantity (in numerical terms) of 
powers assumed by each SGC is a rather rough measure. Not all of them are of the same 
relevance (in terms of specific powers assumed by SGC) but also –and that is the point we 
want to make here- because of the lack of a uniform system. First of all, it is impossible to 
know which is the total number of powers available: the list of powers contained in 
sections 148 and 149 of the Constitution is not exhaustive, and there may be other powers 
not mentioned that SGCs may assume according to section 149.3. Moreover, SGC’s Statutes 
may phrase their powers in different terms and this gives any numerical comparison 
relative value. For that reason we will use the standard classification of powers used by the 
Spanish Ministry of Regional Policy and will classify all transfers of powers according to 
this scheme. We will not analyse the exact content of each of the powers21. 
  
 
21 Following the general approach of this study, we will neither try to weight the importance of different 
powers, nor elaborate our own estimate of the transfer. On the contrary, we will rely on data published by 
the Spanish Ministry for Territorial Policy as an independent, objective and authoritative source for this 
information. 
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Table 122. Summary of the transfer of powers between the  
central government and the self-governing communities (1978-2010) 
 
 
Initial 
Allocation 
by Statute23 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Andalucía 89  2  8 10 28 22 10 5 2   7  
Aragón 63  3  4 9 14 16 5 2 1     
Asturias 44  1  3 12 17 12 8 2 1  3   
Baleares Islands 77  2 1 3 9 14 13 6 3 1     
Canarias 36  1  3 4 21 15 17 5 1 1  7  
Cantabria 43     16 19 9 6 3      
Castilla-La Mancha 89  1  3 11 20 11 8  2  3   
Castilla y León 43    6 10 14 14 9 1 4  3   
Catalonia 89 5 2 13 21 12 11 7 8 3 5  6 1 5 
Extremadura 43  1  3 10 17 13 5 1   4   
Galicia 75  2 1 1 20 18 17 13 3 4 2 8 1  
La Rioja 32      15 9 8 1 2  2   
                                                          
22 Source: Spanish Ministry of Regional Policy  and own elaboration. Annex 1 reproduces a list of powers mentioned by 1978 Spanish Constitution. 
 
Note: “Initial allocation by Statute” refers to the number of powers initially assumed by the SGC in its corresponding Statute of Autonomy (date varied in each one, see list in 
Annex 1). An individual power-count was made for each SGC Statute within the list used by Spanish Ministry of Regional Policy to be consistent with information on power-
transfers used afterwards. 
 
23 Initial allocation took place when each Statute of Autonomy was approved, not necessarily at the same time. See Annex 1 for the list of the Laws approving the Statutes of 
Autonomy of Spanish SGCs. 
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Madrid 35      4 19 13 3   6   
Murcia  42   1 2 11 18 13 7 2 2  2  1 
Navarra 90        16 16 1 3  4  
Basque Country 89 2 1 15 19 6 2  21  7     
Valencia 81  3 1 3 14 21 14 19 4 5  6   
Total 1060 7 19 32 79 154 253 204 179 54 38 6 43 20 6 
 
 
Table 1 (cont´)24. summary of the transfer of powers between the central government and the self-governing communities (1978-2010) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
Andalucía 4   10 1 3  3    1 11 8 3 5 8  1 241 
Aragón 3 4 7 14 1 2 6 3  1 1   1 3 2  1 5 173 
P.  Asturias   5 15    11 4 1    6 1  2   148 
Baleares Islands 1 7  19 5 3 2 7  5    3 2 3  1  187 
Canarias  2 5 12 8  7 2  2   2  3   1 3 159 
Cantabria     25  6 3  2     9 2 3  2 148 
Castilla-La 
Mancha  2  14 5  2 3  2 2    
2     
181 
Castilla & León  3 7 9 7  4 5 3 2 2 3   1    3 154 
Catalonia 4  6 10 2 8 8 4 4 6 2 1 8 1 6 6 5 3 2 274 
Extremadura  1 6 16  3  5  4  2   2    2 139 
Galicia 2  7 9 11 6 5 8   1  3  2 3 7   229 
                                                        
24 Source: Spanish Ministry of Regional Policy and own elaboration. Annex 1 reproduces a list of powers mentioned by 1978 Spanish Constitution. 
Note: On 2010 we provide data accurate in 30.09.2010. 
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La Rioja   8 3 8 2 5  6 2 1    2     107 
Madrid  1 6 12 6 2 3 6 1 1 6 3 1       128 
Murcia  2 7 19  2 2 5  5 2 1     6   153 
Navarra      10  7 2 1          150 
Basque Country   9  6  2 1         2   182 
Valencia 2   7 7 3 4 6 5  1  1 2 1   1  212 
Total 16 22 73 169 92 44 56 79 25 34 18 11 26 21 37 21 33 7 18 2965 
 
 
InDret 4/2010          Marcos, Santaló, Sánchez-Graells  
 
The diverging degree of evolution of the decentralisation process can be easily identified 
throughout the period 1978–2010. For instance, in 1987 (at the end of the first 
decentralisation wave) the average number of powers transferred to SGC was 120 (60 
assumed through the Statute of Autonomy and other 60 directly transferred by the State to 
the SGC); so at that time we could identify three groups of SGC according to the achieved 
level of autonomy: 
 
a) high-level of transfer of powers (above average): Andalucía, Catalonia, Galicia, Basque 
Country and Valencia; 
 
b) medium-level of transfer of powers (close to average): Aragón, Principality of Asturias, 
Baleares Islands, Canarias, Castilla–La Mancha, Castilla & León, Extremadura, and 
Navarra; and 
 
c) low-level of transfer of competencies (well below average): La Rioja, Murcia, Cantabria and 
Madrid. 
 
In 1999 (at the end of the second decentralisation wave), the average number of powers 
assumed by the SGC had increased to 156 (through direct transfer from the State to the 
SGC) and there was a larger concentration of SGC in the mid-level group. 
 
In 2005, the average number of transferred powers has increased to 165 and the 
distribution of SGC according to the level of autonomy assumed displays a similar 
concentration on the high-level of decentralization group. Nowadays, after a substantial 
transfer of powers to Andalucia, Catalonia and Murcia in 2008, the average number of 
powers assumed by SGC is 172. 
 
Therefore, as a general conclusion, we can derive that the decentralisation process is close 
to reaching the ceiling of the framework designed by the Constitution and the SGCs’ 
Statutes of Autonomy (i.e., most of the powers that the SGC could assume have been 
assumed, and in order to transfer them additional powers reforms are required). This is 
one of the reasons why the Statutes of Autonomy of some of the major SGC have been or 
are being renegotiated lately (such as those for Catalonia, Valencia, Andalucía and Baleares 
Islands). 
 
 
4. Measuring Regulatory Burden in the Spanish Decentralized context. 
 
An objective measure of regulatory intensity that comparatively looks at each SGC from 
1978 to 2008 is constructed: it is likely to be largely influenced by the variations in the 
powers assumed by each SGC. Another indicator of number of general rules per SGC and 
pp. for general rules in SGC from 1988 to 2009 will be constructed (infra § 4.1). Moreover, in 
the later we will not only be using the total number of pp. of Spanish regional Official 
 15
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journals, since we can also use a refined variable, including only the legal instruments and 
regulations adopted in each SGC through the number of pp. of the SGC legislative 
chronological report published by the Spanish legal publisher Aranzadi 1988-2009 (infra § 
4.2). 
 
4.1. First Measure: Number of Pp. on the SGCs’ official journals (1978-2008) 
 
We will use the number of pp. of the respective SGCs’ Official journals in which all 
regional laws and rules are published as a proxy for SGC legislative and regulatory 
activism25. 
 
We consider that the number of pp. of SGCs’ Official journals allows us to estimate 
regional regulatory intensity and of the burden that each SGC imposes on economic 
development and business activities in their respective territories.  
 
We believe that quantity of legislation and regulatory activity can be a proxy for the 
interventionism of each SGC in economic development and business environment of their 
corresponding regions. In this regard, it is interesting to compare the evolution of the 
volume of the official publications of the SGC over time (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
25 It is important to stress that, apart from the Official Bulletin of the Central Government (Boletín Oficial del 
Estado), each SGC publishes its own Official Journal. Therefore, nowadays, there are eighteen Official 
Journals being published daily in Spain. And we should not forget that the Official Journal of the 
European Union also publishes daily an important number of legislative and regulatory norms that are 
also applicable to Spanish businesses. We consider that one can easily appreciate the important burden 
that such a dispersion of informative concerning the development of legislation and regulation is 
burdensome to businesses (specially to Small and Medium Enterprises, which constitute the largest block 
of the Spanish business network). 
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Table 226. Number of pp. yearly published in Official Journals of Self Governing Regions (1978-2008) 
 
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
B.O. Junta Andalucia (BOJA) - 62 163 410 560 1.663 2.654 4.012 4.564 6.254 5.708 5.964 9.536 10.660 
11.13
2 11.422 
B.O. Aragón (BOA) 24 52 56 186 449 386 886 1445 1890 3.389 2.138 2.810 4.150 3.832 3.422 4.500 
B.O. P. of Asturias (BOPA) - - - - 928 3.978 4.496 4.854 5.471 8.704 6.300 7.066 7.364 8.570 9.932 9.979 
B.O. Baleares Islands 
(BOCAIB) - - - - - 158 438 584 984 5.794 6.236 9.169 8.151 8.966 
10.50
4 11.126 
B.O. Canarias (BOC) 
- - - - - 622 2.194 2.636 3.714 3.756 3.303 5.044 5.211 7.027 
10.38
3 8.159 
B.O. Cantabria (BOC) - - - - 1.680 1.732 1.968 2.344 3.220 3.592 3.128 3.508 3.504 4.026 4.312 5.328 
D.O. Castilla-La Mancha 
(DOCM) - - - - 287 691 1.469 1.995 2.270 3.184 3.484 3.968 3.814 4.672 6.040 6.884 
B.O. Junta Castilla-León 
(BOCyL) - 40 53 117 365 308 1.282 2.114 2.760 3.700 3.968 4.596 4.789 4.421 5.032 6.400 
Di.O. Generalitat Catalonia 
(DOGC) - 601 1.684 1.892 3.021 3.366 3.942 3.970 4.375 4.763 4.782 5.048 6.176 6.990 7.661 8.966 
D.O. Extremadura (DOE) - - 58 36 135 452 1.108 1.582 1.487 1.388 1.462 2.019 2.042 2.459 3.173 3.369 
D.O. Galicia (DOG) 
- - - - 765 3.817 4.302 4.690 4.094 5.116 5.346 6.202 8.175 10.800 
10.05
6 8.316 
B.O. La Rioja (BOR) - - - - 412 1.559 1.804 1.688 1.776 2.040 2.216 3.926 2.908 4.072 3.716 3.988 
B.O. Comunidad of Madrid 
(BOCM) - - - - - 6.112 
12.15
8 13.664 14.252 14.951 14.936 15.264 16.413 15.545 
16.49
5 18.070 
                                                        
26 Note: See Annex 2 for an explanation of how the count was performed and additional information. 
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B.O. Región of Murcia 
(BORM) - - - - 1.418 3.424 6.208 4.868 5.404 5.390 5.884 6.276 7.276 7.984 9.460 11.008 
B.O. Navarra (BON) 904 965 984 1.108 788 2.386 2.322 2.842 3.256 3.618 3.700 4.542 5.038 6.240 6.360 5.776 
B.O. País Vasco (BOPV) 
108 284 254 2.472 3.239 4.580 5.083 6.117 6.575 6.253 7.630 8.689 11.736 10.133 
11.63
8 11.971 
D.O. Generalitat Valenciana 
(DOGV) 48 145 307 400 418 1.661 3.110 4.395 5.499 5.582 7.280 9.417 11.416 11.882 
13.22
0 13.793 
TOTAL (excluding Ceuta & 
Melilla) 1.084 2.149 3.559 6.621 
14.46
5 
36.89
5 
55.42
4 63.800 71.591 87.474 87.501 103.508 117.699 128.279 
142.5
36 149.055 
Official Bulletin of the State 
(BOE) 29.520 
29.99
0 
28.91
0 
30.64
7 
35.84
7 
35.05
2 
37.64
7 40.824 42.520 38.424 36.856 40.485 39.020 42.102 
45.11
2 20.028 
Total BOE + All SGC 
Journals 30.604 
32.13
9 
32.46
9 
37.26
8 
50.31
2 
71.94
7 
93.07
1 104.624 114.111 125.898 124.357 143.993 156.719 170.381 
187.6
48 169.083 
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Table 2 (cont’)27. Number of pp. yearly published in Official Journals of Self Governing Regions (1978-2008) 
                                                        
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
14.012 12.624 17.074 15.428 16.048 16.820 19.440 20.992 25.280 27.664 29.992 36.709 45.120 42.860 43.596 
B.O. Junta Andalucia 
(BOJA)  
5.496 4295 5892 6.736 6.336 7.136 8.088 10.396 11.472 13.218 12.752 16.558 17.246 18.080 27.580 B.O. Aragón (BOA) 
11.904 13.856 13.951 16.396 16.053 14.192 15.264 16.326 16.672 16.272 19.168 23.100 24.732 24.668 28.760 
B.O. P. of Asturias 
(BOPA) 
12.664 13.503 17.887 19.396 20.498 18.160 20.462 20.935 23.631 27.763 28.014 29.396 31.005 31.058 32.767 
B.O. Baleares Islands 
(BOCAIB) 
10.203 12.667 13.246 15.504 16.027 17.444 19.487 19.832 22.636 20.840 22.788 24.792 30.168 28.384 26.771 B.O. Canarias (BOC) 
5.720 6.116 7.884 8.304 8.144 9.652 10.030 11.099 12.247 11.867 13.436 15.194 16.664 17.831 18.360 B.O. Cantabria (BOC) 
4.664 7.036 6.460 8.808 10.504 10.652 12.836 15.214 19.516 20.552 22.410 24.628 29.381 32.098 42.732 
D.O. Castilla-La 
Mancha (DOCM) 
7.758 9.253 11.210 10.231 12.076 13.164 16.464 19.864 18.516 17.480 18.952 22.696 24.404 25.048 27.463 
B.O. Junta Castilla-León 
(BOCyL) 
8.656 9.762 13.915 15.610 16.531 16.694 17.074 20.147 23.279 26.036 27.311 44.067 54.632 58.286 95.482 
Di.O. Generalitat 
Catalonia (DOGC) 
5.384 5.592 6.409 8.903 9.605 10.252 12.919 12.966 15.768 15.567 15.832 18.408 21.807 20.132 35.481 
D.O. Extremadura 
(DOE) 
8.664 9.854 12.092 12.640 13.948 15.432 17.148 16.676 18.132 16.524 18.700 20.588 19.100 20.544 23.428 D.O. Galicia (DOG) 
4.798 4.560 5.128 5.280 5.236 5.300 5.312 5.820 6.166 6.380 7.224 7.708 7.740 8.508 12.307 B.O. La Rioja (BOR) 
29.564 29.179 30.626 32.672 34.448 32.818 34.591 43.443 40.770 44.864 49.393 48.140 50.688 54.787 58.362 B.O. Comunidad of 
27 Note: See Annex 2 for an explanation of how the count was performed and additional information. 
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Madrid (BOCM) 
11.648 13.808 14.248 14.408 14.442 13.748 14.270 17.014 18.882 22.518 28.402 29.588 36.104 36.536 41.504 
B.O. Región of Murcia 
(BORM) 
6.270 6.766 7.814 8.980 9.375 9.978 10.516 10.220 11.240 12.180 11.816 12.792 13.700 13.736 14.592 B.O. Navarra (BON) 
16.199 16.183 20.664 20.035 24.235 21.638 23.678 23.225 23.672 25.690 23.814 23.220 25.995 30.974 32.908 B.O. País Vasco (BOPV) 
15.537 17.644 15.309 20.349 21.117 21.398 24.467 28.328 33.942 31.602 34.496 41.872 42.000 48.001 93.925 
D.O. Generalitat 
Valenciana (DOGV) 
179.141 192.698 219.809 239.680 254.623 254.478 282.046 312.497 341.821 357.017 384.500 439.456 490.486 511.531 656.018 
TOTAL (excluding 
Ceuta & Melilla) 
39.653 37.702 39.148 38.682 44.759 46.650 46.866 50.731 46.430 47.099 42.935 43.468 46.886 54.032 52.850 
Official Bulletin of the 
State (BOE) 
218.794 230.400 258.957 278.362 299.382 301.128 328.912 363.228 388.251 404.116 427.435 482.924 537.372 565.563 708.868 
Total BOE + All SGC 
Journals 
InDret 4/2010  Marcos, Santaló, Sánchez-Graells          
It is also interesting to analyse the intensity of legislative and regulatory activity of the SGC 
through the ratio of published pp. in the SGC Official journals per assumed power. As it 
could be expected, the average number of pp. published in the SGCs’ Official journals per 
(assumed) power has constantly increased and has nearly been multiplied by ten times in 
the period 1978 – 2008 (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Therefore, as a general conclusion, we see how after the first thirty years of Spanish 
decentralisation, SGC regulate more both in absolute terms and in terms relative to the 
number of assumed competencies and of legislative or regulatory norms approved. 
Interestingly enough, this increase of the SGC legislative and regulatory activity has not 
been followed by a proportional decrease of the legislative and regulatory activity of the 
Central Government –that has maintained a flat evolution, with very insignificant 
reductions in the number of published pp.–. 
 
4.2. Second measure: Data from Aranzadi reporter (1988-2009). 
 
The Aranzadi Chronological legislative collection, issued once a year, compiles all 
legislative and regulatory acts of a general application approved by each SGC for that 
given year. Since 1988, the Aranzadi report has been permanently published in a uniform 
format across SGC and over years, what makes it a very valuable tool for our purposes.  
Therefore, we consider it a more refined proxy for regulatory intensity of SGC than official 
journals pp. (although official journals’ length tells us some additional information about 
SGC interventionism on economic activity).  
 
We can carry out the same analysis performed above with SGCs’ Official journals but 
based now on the Aranzadi Regional Legislative Collection data, and we will reach similar 
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conclusions (for the period 1988–2009, which is the period covered by the Aranzadi SGC 
legislative compilation, see Table 3). 
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Table 328. Number of pp. published in Aranzadi Chronological Legislative Reporter (SGCs & Central State) 1978-2009 
 
  1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Andalucía           636 568 691 801 939 1.150 1.497 1.148 
Aragón           237 330 270 472 462 458 608 701 
Asturias           266 243 190 386 320 435 640 612 
Baleares Islands           169 247 251 213 365 385 555 538 
Canarias           271 386 485 749 536 819 1029 1.105 
Cantabria           93 227 172 270 281 306 248 343 
Castilla-La Mancha           163 162 215 317 314 323 333 463 
Castilla & León           314 437 523 455 509 519 856 674 
Catalonia           635 901 1.010 896 1.241 1273 1415 1.651 
Extremadura           120 219 255 242 347 281 392 390 
Galicia           595 477 497 570 771 773 1054 849 
La Rioja           228 151 301 215 396 421 534 531 
Madrid           233 171 292 313 677 693 779 1.138 
Murcia           248 258 341 289 520 450 670 915 
Navarra           445 615 810 797 875 971 809 1.099 
Basque Country           480 571 1.066 1.119 1316 1298 1434 1.259 
Valencia           424 477 584 624 748 919 1266 1.235 
Sum all SGC     1.633 2.933 3.638 4.635 5.759 4.798 5.557 6.440 7.953 8.728 10.617 11.474 14.119 14.651 
Central State National 
Reporter 3.179 3.857 4.037 4.742 5.852 4.706 5.592 6.867 8.376 7.193 7.550 9.396 8.849 9.518 11.835 14.014 10.615 10.496 
 
                                                        
28 Note: It excludes chronological, alphabetical and topic indexes (see Annex 3 for an explanation of how the count was performed and additional information). 
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Table 3 (cont’)29. Number of pp. published in Aranzadi Legislative Reporter (SGCs & Central State) 1978-2009 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   
1.513 1.343 1.314 1.160 1.240 1.507 1.584 2.058 1.283 2.197 1.983 2.194 2.323 2.192 Andalucía 
712 701 726 834 839 1.233 1.334 1.113 915 1.110 1.374 1.152 1.393 1.585 Aragón 
490 703 690 654 692 1.121 1.408 934 882 1.120 1.113 1329 1.579 2.052 Asturias 
555 729 812 750 727 1.254 1.144 980 854 1.333 1.381 862 992 1.052 Baleares Islands 
754 796 920 986 851 800 960 1.244 1.020 1.124 1.491 1.186 1.138 1.315 Canarias 
480 433 601 593 572 775 817 817 928 934 1.232 1.206 1.178 1.066 Cantabria 
498 499 769 776 641 934 1.139 906 897 1.075 1.185 1.149 1.687 1.412 Castilla-La Mancha 
832 747 1.105 1.071 1308 1.369 1.754 1.954 1.476 1.643 1.669 1.884 1.667 2.727 Castilla & León 
1.475 1.830 1.853 1.706 1.976 2.289 2.498 2.736 1.963 2.743 3.378 2.836 3.408 3.064 Catalonia 
555 497 746 590 724 881 953 644 864 1.207 1.176 1.348 1.539 1.570 Extremadura 
1.103 1.205 1.280 1.204 1.495 1.199 1.230 1.136 1.143 1.255 1.227 1.538 2.160 1.698 Galicia 
506 394 678 537 862 713 801 820 855 1.098 1.096 1.091 1.160 1.319 La Rioja 
1.015 1.092 1.363 1543 1.426 1.638 1.731 1.696 1.151 1.702 1.739 1.304 1.561 1.565 Madrid 
711 831 885 668 781 1.180 1.559 1.252 1.193 1.405 1.512 1.489 1.463 1.611 Murcia 
1.096 1.149 1.293 1133 1.129 1.338 1.158 1.244 1.110 1.217 1.102 1.441 1.251 1.198 Navarra 
1.493 1.499 1.987 1312 1.728 1.498 1.293 1.545 1.217 1.711 1.552 1.649 1.927 1.367 Basque Country 
790 1.237 1.290 1134 1.194 1.332 1.406 1.351 1.348 1.610 1.817 1.810 1.773 1.932 Valencia 
14.578 15.685 18.312 16.651 18.185 21.061 22.769 22.430 19.099 24.484 26.027 25.468 28.199 28.725 Sum all SGC 
11 12. 3 8.607 10.398 8.350 8.238 9.959 9.324 9.153 8.454 7.759 9.202 8.705 10.176 11.235 
Central State National 
Reporter 
                                                        
29 Note: It ecludes chronological, alphabetical and topic indexes (see Annex 3 for an explanation of how the count was performed and additional information). 
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In Table 4, we observe how in the period 1988–2009, the number of laws and other general 
norms passed by SGC displays a significant variance. But, maybe most worth noting, an 
important increasing tendency in the number of norms approved can be easily identified in 
all SGC. 
 
Finally, as an additional measure of regulatory intensity we will look at the number of 
rules of general scope or efficacy adopted by each SGC. Undoubtedly, more rules always 
means a higher regulation intensity, although again this indicator can be criticized for still 
being too vague. Some of those laws or regulations will not be related to business or 
economic activities but only concern administrative or organization issues regarding each 
SGC. Nevertheless, it could generally be said that the number of general dispositions 
adopted by each SGC conveys a good image of how active it is in using rules as an 
instrument to exercise its powers. 
As we can see in Table 3, the number of total pp. published by the Aranzadi Regional 
Legislative Reporter has been steeply increasing during the last twenty-two years. 
Moreover, the same conclusion holds in relation with the number of Aranzadi pp. per total 
number of SGC assumed powers (looking at Table 1 supra, see Figure 2 supra). 
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Table 430. Number of marginals accumulated (yearly), Aranzadi Chronological Legislative Reporter (1978-2009) 
 
  1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Andalucía           330 368 390 341 301 395 426 458 
Aragón           163 165 159 201 253 216 335 334 
Asturias           120 151 108 142 152 169 193 245 
Baleares Islands           168 173 160 160 195 230 272 247 
Canarias           182 263 230 290 268 316 331 335 
Cantabria           61 94 88 124 116 114 108 131 
Castilla-La Mancha           130 135 129 182 231 239 171 196 
Castilla & León           226 299 261 305 319 347 416 371 
Catalonia           443 526 492 539 623 606 665 708 
Extremadura           113 159 170 179 190 194 251 229 
Galicia           249 267 281 285 323 334 369 351 
La Rioja           98 92 186 194 217 242 269 208 
Madrid           145 148 154 199 279 291 333 424 
Murcia           142 151 139 157 192 187 242 290 
Navarra           260 266 307 395 356 381 333 386 
Basque Country           256 256 414 381 426 537 574 420 
Valencia           314 269 278 342 310 371 416 412 
Sum SGC     1.335 2.302 3.131 3583 3.785 3.252 3.400 3.782 3.946 4.416 4.751 5.169 5.704 5.745 
State National Reporter 2.866 3.128 2.885 3.159 3.535 2.893 2.989 3106 3.935 2.751 2.652 2.818 2.751 3.068 2.883 3.646 3.604 3.556 
                                                        
30 Note: Each marginal corresponds to one general norm adopted (be it an act, a regulation, an order, etc.). 
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Table 4 (con’t)31. Number of marginals accumulated (yearly), Aranzadi Chronological Legislative Reporter (1978-2009) 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
486 442 435 438 447 487 590 651 601 660 615 593 596 542 Andalucía 
326 259 241 291 322 488 686 394 360 389 414 446 502 554 Aragón 
223 218 213 244 274 369 345 333 309 335 375 429 475 554 Asturias 
298 328 330 346 368 379 450 328 314 443 394 365 347 399 Baleares Islands 
335 386 336 351 271 305 361 435 360 351 447 519 499 446 Canarias 
220 184 209 224 211 264 312 286 295 354 352 339 350 311 Cantabria 
218 208 325 286 290 410 394 381 319 359 385 427 553 456 Castilla-La Mancha 
439 390 443 408 528 546 652 619 497 531 601 623 604 868 Castilla & León 
660 643 705 726 700 765 832 856 714 773 976 742 888 806 Cataluña 
258 223 227 282 301 267 292 262 279 366 347 408 416 447 Extremadura 
408 445 423 429 382 389 386 393 402 399 401 408 541 442 Galicia 
264 185 263 253 281 241 265 268 264 267 310 347 344 324 La Rioja 
422 428 540 629 614 621 631 577 450 544 516 433 465 491 Madrid 
224 218 285 267 288 345 391 405 354 381 415 395 402 386 Murcia 
447 450 407 439 350 402 394 510 392 378 343 420 390 399 Navarra 
531 592 594 486 563 523 496 499 423 468 407 418 426 424 País Vasco 
366 384 416 414 416 439 471 421 458 494 526 530 510 553 Valencia 
6.125 5.983 6.392 6.075 6.606 7.240 7.948 7.618 6.791 7.492 7.824 7.842 8.308 8.402 Sum SGC 
3.209 3.137 3.113 3.300 3.072 3.291 3.114 3.118 2.737 2.608 2.372 1.972 2.221 2.676 State National Reporter 
 
 
                                                        
31 Note: Each marginal corresponds to one general norm adopted (be it an act, a regulation, an order, etc.). 
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As a simple elaboration of some the previous information, we can calculate the number of 
pp. per approved rule and we see how it has doubled during the period 1988–2009. 
 
Additionally, as a further test of consistency of all the SGC regulatory indicators 
constructed Table 5 shows how not surprisingly all three regulatory indexes are 
significantly correlated (p-value less than 0.0001). The last column also shows how all three 
indexes have a strong correlation with the number of powers transferred from the central 
government. 
 
Table 5: correlation matrix between regulatory variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) Official Journal Pp.  1 0.27*** 0.42*** 0.62*** 
(2) Aranzadi Marginals  1 0.92*** 0.73*** 
(3) Aranzadi Pp.   1 0.73*** 
(4) Powers transferred    1 
Where *** represents that the correlations coefficient is significantly different than zero with a 
p-value less than 0.0001. 
 
Next we investigate to what degree the increase in all three regulatory indexes in 1978-2009 
can be explained by the empowerment of Spanish regions during the same period. Table 6 
displays the results of three OLS regressions in which the unit of observation is at the SGC-
year level. Since the variables extracted from the Aranzadi Chronological Reporter (per 
SGC) only start in 1988 we run the three regressions using only information from that date 
onwards. The dependent variable is each of our regulatory indexes and the dependent 
variables are two: first, the accumulated total number of powers that the Spanish state has 
transferred to a given region in a given year to account by the fact that more empowered 
regions will legislate more; second the regional population that given year since more 
heavily populated regions might legislate a larger amount of pp.32 . 
 
Table 6: regression of regulatory indexes on transference of powers 
 Dep. Variable= 
Official Journal Pp. 
Dep. Variable= 
Aranzadi Marginals 
Dep. Variable= 
Aranzadi Pp. 
Constant -43870*** 
(8195) 
-556*** 
(96) 
-1016*** 
(342) 
Transference of 
powers 
85.25*** 
(14.31) 
2.20*** 
(0.16) 
8.83*** 
(0.60) 
Population 3208*** 
(645) 
41.27*** 
(7.61) 
47.41* 
(27.13) 
R2 0.28 
                                                       
0.56 0.53 
 
32 In non-reported results we have also run more complex regressions in which the independent variables 
–apart from population and accumulated transferred competencies- were regional GDP and transferred 
competences to the square. However these two variables were either barely significant or we could not 
reject the hypothesis that their coefficients were equal to zero. This is why here we have just displayed the 
result of the simplest set of regressions. 
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Where *** represents that the correlations coefficient is significantly different than zero with a p-value 
less than 0.0001 and the estimated standard error of the regressions coefficients are displayed below 
among parenthesis. 
 
The last row of Table 6 shows how the variation of our regulatory indexes that can be 
explained by changes in population levels and regional empowerment is 56% at the most. 
This means that almost half of the variation in our regulation indexes is not accounted by 
the decentralization of the Spanish State and may be driven by a trend towards more 
regulation. 
 
Using the estimated coefficients displayed in Table 6, we can estimate what should have 
been the value of our indexes for each region-year according to its level of empowerment 
and population. This allows us to compute the degree of deviation from real levels of our 
indexes. In percentage terms, we compute this difference between real and estimated 
regulatory index for each region-year and then we take the average across all years by 
region. The results are displayed in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. % difference between real value of the regulatory index and the estimated value 
according to levels of regional population and regional empowerment  
Region 
According to Official 
Journal pp. 
According to 
Aranzadi 
Marginals 
According to 
Aranzadi pp. 
Andalucía -24.8% -12.6% -12.3% 
Aragón -44.3% -6.8% -18.7% 
P.  Asturias +21% -17.4% -8.7% 
Balearic Islands +22.7% -18.3% -35.7% 
Canarias +3.2% +0.00% +2.4% 
Cantabria -4.7% -20.9% +18.7% 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 
-20.3% -14.85% -21.2% 
Castilla & León -12.8%. +29.0% +21.3% 
Catalonia -31.1% +18.6% +5.2% 
Extremadura -21.8% -11.3% -15.35% 
Galicia -36.8% -24.5% -28.08% 
La Rioja +40.6% +52.8% +66.6% 
Madrid +105% +29.23% +57.8% 
Murcia +28.7% -10.8% +5.7% 
Navarra -20.6% +28.5% +22.5% 
Basque Country +0.006% +8.1% +11.1% 
Valencia -1.1% -18.7% -20.3% 
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5. Conclusion. 
 
This paper provides useful and descriptive tools and statistics of the regulatory sprawl of 
Spanish Self Governing Communities (SGC) since their inception thirty-two years ago. The 
time-series indicators constructed (1978-2009) take into account progressive transfers of 
powers by the central state and variations in the powers assumed by each SGC.  
Our indicators are built around an objective and rough measure: the amount of legislation 
or regulation adopted by each SGC measured both by pp. published in regional official 
journals and regional legislative reporters and rules adopted by each SGC. Through them 
we may look at SGCs’ regulatory strategies (if there are any). Additionally, we cross-
checked the consistency and correlation among all regulatory indicators and further 
performed a regression analysis of their relationship with progressive SGCs’ empowerment 
over time. Further research should look at the impact disparate quantities of regulation by 
SGC may have had in economic performance. 
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Annex 1: Constitutional Framework For The Distribution Of Powers Between 
The Central Government And The Self-Governing Communities 
 
Section 148: 1. The Self-governing Communities may assume powers over the following 
matters:  
 
1. Organization of their institutions of self-government. 2. Changes in municipal 
boundaries within their territory and, in general, functions appertaining to the State 
Administration regarding local Corporations, whose transfer may be authorised by 
legislation on local government. 3. Town and country planning and housing. 4. Public 
works of interest to the Self-governing Community, within its own territory. 5. Railways 
and roads whose routes lie exclusively within the territory of the Self-governing 
Community and transport by the above means or by cable fulfilling the same conditions. 6. 
Ports of haven, recreational ports and airports and, in general, those which are not engaged 
in commercial activities. 7. Agriculture and livestock raising, in accordance with general 
economic planning.  8. Woodlands and forestry. 9. Management of environmental 
protection.  
 
10. Planning, construction and exploitation of hydraulic projects, canals and irrigation of 
interest to the Self-governing Community; mineral and thermal waters. 11. Inland water 
fishing, shellfish industry and fish-farming, hunting and river fishing. 12. Local fairs. 13. 
Promotion of economic development of the Self-governing Community within the 
objectives set by national economic policy. 14. Handicrafts. 15. Museums, libraries and 
music conservatories of interest to the Self-governing Community. 16. The Self-governing 
Community’s monuments of interest. 17. The promotion of culture and research and, 
where applicable, the teaching of the Self-governing Community’s language. 18. The 
promotion and planning of tourism within its territorial area. 
  
19. The promotion of sports and the proper use of leisure. 20. Social assistance. 21. Health 
and hygiene. 22. The supervision and protection of its buildings and installations. 
Coordination and other powers relating to local police forces under the terms to be laid 
down by an organic act. 
 
Section 149: 1. The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: 
 
1. Regulation of basic conditions guaranteeing the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise 
of their rights and in the fulfilment of their constitutional duties. 2. Nationality, 
immigration, emigration, status of aliens, and right of asylum. 3. International relations. 4. 
Defence and the Armed Forces. 5. Administration of Justice. 6. Commercial, criminal and 
penitentiary legislation; procedural legislation, without prejudice to the necessary 
specialities in these fields arising from the peculiar features of the substantive law of the 
Self-governing Communities. 7. Labour legislation, without prejudice to its execution by 
bodies of the Self-governing Communities. 8. Civil legislation, without prejudice to the 
preservation, modification and development by the Self-governing Communities of their 
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civil law, or special rights and traditional charters (fueros), whenever these exist. In any 
event, rules for the application and effectiveness of legal provisions, civil relations arising 
from the forms of marriage, keeping of records and drawing up to public instruments, 
bases of contractual liability, rules for resolving conflicts of law and determination of the 
sources of law in conformity, in this last case, with the rules of traditional charters (fueros) 
or special laws. 9. Legislation on copyright and industrial property. 10. Customs and tariff 
regulations; foreign trade. 11. Monetary system: foreign currency, exchange and 
convertibility; bases for the regulations concerning credit, banking and insurance. 12. 
Legislation on weights and measures and determination of the official time. 13. Basic rules 
and coordination of general economic planning. 14. General financial affairs and State 
Debt. 15. Promotion and general coordination of scientific and technical research.  
 
16. External health measures; basic conditions and general coordination of health matters; 
legislation on pharmaceutical products. 17. Basic legislation and financial system of Social 
Security, without prejudice to implementation of its services by the Self-governing 
Communities. 18. Basic rules of the legal system of Public Administrations and the status of 
their officials which shall, in any case, guarantee that all persons under said 
administrations will receive equal treatment; the common administrative procedure, 
without prejudice to the special features of the Self-governing Communities’ own 
organizations; legislation on compulsory expropriation; basic legislation on contracts and 
administrative concessions and the system of liability of all Public Administrations. 19. Sea 
fishing, without prejudice to the powers which, in regulations governing this sector, may 
be vested to the Self-governing Communities. 20. Merchant navy and registering of ships; 
lighting of coasts and signals at sea; general interest ports; general-interest airports; control 
of the air space, air traffic and transport; meteorological services and aircraft registration. 
21. Railways and land transport crossing through the territory of more than one Self-
governing Community; general system of communications; motor vehicle traffic; Post 
Office services and telecommunications; air and underwater cables and radio 
communications. 22. Legislation, regulation and concession of hydraulic resources and 
development where the water-streams flow through more than one Self-governing 
Community, and authorization for hydro-electrical power plants whenever their operation 
affects other Communities or the lines of energy transportation are extended over other 
Communities. 23. Basic legislation on environmental protection, without prejudice to 
powers of the Self-governing Communities to take additional protective measures; basic 
legislation on woodlands, forestry and cattle trails. 24. Public works of general benefit or 
whose execution affects more than one Self-governing Community. 25. Basic regulation of 
mining and energy. 26. Manufacturing, sale, possession and use of arms and explosives. 27. 
Basic rules relating to organization of the press, radio and television and, in general, all 
mass-communications media without prejudice to powers vested in the Self-governing 
Communities for their development and implementation. 28. Protection of Spain’s cultural 
and artistic heritage and national monuments against exportation and spoliation; 
museums, libraries, and archives belonging to the State, without prejudice to their 
management by the Self-governing Communities. 29. Public safety, without prejudice to 
the possibility of Self-governing Communities creating police forces, as provided for in 
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their respective Statutes of Autonomy and within the framework to be laid down by an 
organic act. 30. Regulation of the requirements for obtention, issuance and standardization 
of academic degrees and professional qualifications and basic rules for implementation of 
section 27 of the Constitution, in order to guarantee the fulfilment of the duties of public 
authorities in this matter. 31. Statistics for State purposes. 32. Authorization of popular 
consultations through the holding of referendums. 
 
Laws Approving the Statutes of Autonomy of the Spanish SGC 
 
Andalucía LO 6/1981, of 30 december (BOE 9, of 11 january 1982)  
 last amendment LO 2/2007, of 19 march (BOE 68, of 20 march 2007) 
Aragón LO 8/1982, of 10 august (BOE 195, of 16 august1982)  
 last amendment LO 5/2007, of 20 april (BOE 97, of 23 april 2007) 
Principality of Asturias LO 7/1981 of 30 december (BOE 9, of 11 january 1982)  
Baleares Islands LO 2/1983, of 25 february (BOE 51, of 1 march 1983)  
 last amendment LO 1/2007, of 28 february (BOE 52, of 1 march 
2007) 
Canarias LO 10/1982, of 10 august (BOE 195, of 16 august 1982)  
Cantabria LO 8/1981, of 30 december(BOE 9, of 11 january 1982)  
Castilla-La Mancha LO 9/1982, of 10 august (BOE 195, of 16 august 1982)  
Castilla & León LO 4/1983, of 25 february (BOE 52, of 2 march 1983)  
 last amendment LO 14/2007, 20 april (BOE 
Cataluña LO 4/1979, of 18 december (BOE 306, of 22 decemeber 1979)  
 last amendment LO 6/2006, of 19 july (BOE 172, pf  20 july 2006) 
Extremadura LO 1/1983, of 25 february (BOE 49, of 26 february 1983)  
 pending amendment in Congress (presented on 28 september 2009). 
Galicia LO 1/1981, of 6 april (BOE 101, of 28 march 1981) 
La Rioja LO 3/1982, of 9 june (BOE 146, of 19 march 1982)  
Madrid LO 3/1983, of 25 february (BOE 51, of 1 march 1983)  
Murcia LO 4/1982, of 9 june (BOE 146, 19 june 1982)  
Navarra LO 13/1982, of 10 august, of reintegration and improvement of 
autonomy conditions of Navarre (BOE 195, of 16 august 1982) 
Vasque Country LO 3/1979, of 18 december (BOE 306, of 22 december 1979) 
Comunidad Valenciana LO 5/1982, of 1 july (BOE 164, of 10 july 1982) 
 last amendment LO 1/2006, of 10 april (BOE 86, 11 march 2006)
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Annex 2: Complementary Information On The Data Extracted From Counting 
Sgc Journals 
 
The SGC regulatory intensity indicator based on regional official journals (supra § 4.1) was 
constructed through a page-count of SGC official gazettes per natural year.  The digital 
copies of the journals were used when available; however, to certain extent, issues 
published before the nineties physical copies of the journals were used. Access to the 
Libraries at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and National Library made the 
counting possible. 
 
A few SGC official journals number the their journals’ pp. consecutively in each following 
issue (like the national official gazette) from page 1 every year making the exercise easier. 
Others do it every month, so a month count was performed and all months added to get 
final annual score. Others do it every issue (day), so all issues had to be checked and 
summed up to reach a yearly measure. Generally, the same format is used by each SGC 
official publication over the time, so the measure per SGC is consistent. 
 
In those cases in which official journals were page numbered consecutively (like the 
Central State Official Bulletin -Boletín Oficial del Estado- and the majority of SGC official 
journals) it was enough to look at the last issue published each year (generally, on the 30th 
or 31st of December), as it provided information concerning the total number of pp. 
published per year. 
 
In the cases in which each issue of official Journal was page numbered independently (as it 
happens in the Madrid Community and Catalonia from the beginning, Baleares Islands 
from 2005 and Andalucia from 2005), it was necessary to check one by one all the issues 
published each year and to calculate the accumulated number of pp. resulted from 
summing up all the published issues. 
 
However, in the case of Catalonia, there exists a publication in CD-ROM by the Entitat 
Autònoma del Diari Oficial i de Publicacions de la Generalitat de Catalunya that gathers all 
the published journals until 2001 and follows an unofficial page-numbering that we have 
used for the construction of our database. 
 
Official Journals include a wide variety of information. Naturally, they publish general 
norms (laws and regulations that apply to citizens and firms). But they also publish 
information regarding appointments, resignations and other decisions regarding public 
officials. They also publish information concerning public procurement, judgments and 
other public notices (even announcements by private firms and citizens may be included).  
Moreover, in the performance of the counting, supplementary issues that were published 
attached to ordinary or regular issues of the bulletin were not taken into account. Normally 
these supplementary issues contain information regarding municipal administrations and 
notices to individuals, so they add few information regarding regulatory activities by 
SGCs. 
 38
InDret 4/2010  Marcos, Santaló, Sánchez-Graells          
Neither have we included the extraordinary issues of official journals. There is not a 
uniform policy among SGCs’ oficial journals regarding their publication, indeed some of 
the SGC journals do not publish extraordinary issues at all.  In those cases in which they 
are published there is not a uniform criterion determining what contents belong to them. 
Therefore, we have opted for excluding them from the database, that only includes 
ordinary issues of the oficial bulletin. 
 
On the other hand, as supplements and extraordinary issues kept independent page 
numbering, naturally they were automatically excluded from the total number of pp. 
published as it appeared in the last issue of the year for those SGC page numbered them 
consecutively. In some isolated cases it is possible that some supplement or special number 
of the oficial Journal was numbered consecutively instead of being page-numbered 
independently, but these are rather uncommon and random cases, and for that reason we 
have not made any specific adjustment to face these errors in our database. For those SGC 
that page-number independently each issue of Journal, supplements and extraordinary 
issues have not been counted, 
 
Finally, from 2008 onwards some SGC (Principality of Asturias, Murcia) have opted for an 
online digital publication system in which every norm of the journal is paged 
independently, this makes impossible to perform the page count exercise since then. 
 
Annex 3: Complementary Information On The Database Constructed From 
Aranzadi Regional Chronological Legislative Reporter 
 
The SGC regulatory intensity indicator based on Aranzadi Legislative Collection regional 
reported pp. (supra  § 4.2) was constructed through a page count of each SGC Aranzadi 
reporter. This Collection started in 1982 but the first few years (1982-1987) it compiled in 
one volume all SGC legislation and regulation and, thus, it was not valid for our purposes. 
After 1988, due to the volume reached by the published report, it was divided in 17 
regional reports that segregate the data per SGC. For this reason, data from 1982 to 1987 are 
aggregated, whilst 1988-2009 they are disaggregated per SGC. 
 
Therefore, a page-count exercise of the Aranzadi Regional reporter offers also a clear 
indicator of regulatory activity by SGC, capturing also the evolution of the administrative 
and organization activities by public administrations, including administration of justice 
and, in a lesser extent evolution of general economic activity (although the announcements 
by firms and citizens are a tiny part of the total publication volume of official journals). 
Of course, despite having the same contents, the number of pp. published per year by each 
GC Aranzadi Reporter is a different measure than the number of pp. published in the 
orresponding Official Journal. 
S
c
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